Blue pill red pill Bluetooth#
We validated the efficacy of our design by implementing it on a commercial Bluetooth Low Energy development board and measuring its latency and energy consumption. Although bivariate secret sharing has been used before in slightly different ways, our scheme is leaner and more efficient and achieves a new property-cold boot protection. Remarkably, our key storage costs for the wearables that supply the cryptographic shares are very modest (256 bits) and remain constant even if the token holds thousands of credentials. We present a cryptographic countermeasure-bivariate secret sharing-that protects all the credentials except the one in use at that time, even if the token is captured while it is on. This method, however, is vulnerable to a cold boot attack: an adversary who captures a running Pico could extract the master key from its RAM and steal all of the user’s credentials. The Pico academic project proposes an authentication token unlocked by the proximity of simpler wearable devices that provide shares of the token’s master key. Hardware tokens for user authentication need a secure and usable mechanism to lock them when not in use.
Because we advocate a hybrid system it is possible to simplify the trusted system to a point where it would not be usable as a general purpose system, which should make the trusted system rather easier to build and have confidence in. This paper does not provide a working solution (it is a position paper after all) we simply define how one should approach that working solution. We identify a minimum set of requirements for the trusted device. However, most of those attempts have not properly addressed the requirements for the trusted system, generally preferring to use existing general-purpose systems even when on a "dedicated device." Others have a very limited scope of use. Obviously our idea is not a completely novel idea prior work in the area has had a similar goal. We believe that the technology required for such a device is readily available. Most user interaction occurs on the un-trusted system, with the secure device only being used to finalise transactions. We suggest a solution that involves taking both the Blue Pill and the Red Pill: providing the trusted path by means of a separate device with a secure operating system, used in tandem with the existing general purpose operating system. Solving the problem by taking the Red Pill and completely replacing currently used operating systems with ones that we can properly secure does not seem palatable. One simply cannot properly secure a general-purpose operating system. We posit that those who attempt to solve this problem by creating the trusted path on the general-purpose operating system have taken the Blue Pill and are living in a fantasy world. Authorization and authentication of online transactions across a network requires a trusted path between the user and the server. The real world, in turn, while real, has no visible sun, and the people have only gray mush for food.
Blue pill red pill full#
The fantasy world appears to those living in it to be full of flowers and trees and big steak dinners, but unknown to them contains malicious Agents who can alter any portion of the world to suit their needs.
Blue pill red pill movie#
In the movie "The Matrix," our hero Neo must choose between taking the Blue Pill and continuing to live in an online, synthesized fantasy world, or taking the Red Pill and joining the real world.
0 kommentar(er)
